Can social comparison nudge bureaucrats? Evidence from environmental information disclosure

主讲人: 陆方文

陆方文,于2011年毕业于美国加州伯克利大学经济学博士,现任中国人民大学经济学院教授,2018年度教育部青年长江学者和国家自科基金优秀青年项目获得者。她擅长运用随机实验方法探讨行为经济学和发展经济学领域的热点难点问题,其研究成果发表在《Management Science》、《Journal of Development Economics》、《Journal of Labor Economics》、《Journal of Public Economics》 (2)、《Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization》、《Journal of Environmental Economics and Management》、《经济研究》等多家国际国内顶级或领先学术期刊。她的论文荣获“教育部第五届全国教育科学研究优秀成果奖”和“北京市第十四届哲学社会科学优秀成果奖”,并且被杰弗里·佩罗夫撰写的 《Microeconomics》和《Microeconomics: Theory and Applications with Calculus》等国际经典教科书引用。

主持人: 蔡熙乾

Government information disclosure is an important part of public management, but the actual implementation is very diverse in China. We conducted a randomized field experiment among 303 prefecture-level cities and test whether social comparison can nudge bureaucrats into providing more environmental information. The city governments are randomly divided into three groups: the control group receiving the information request only; the parallel comparison group additionally being informed that seven other cities have posted relevant information online; the upward comparison group being told that the applicant has successfully requested similar information from the province government. The two treatment groups are not more likely to release information with one exception – when there is considerable ambiguity on whether the information is legal to disclose, the upward comparison increases the likelihood of disclosure.

时间: 2018-11-08(Thursday)16:40-18:00
地点: N302, Econ Building
期数: 高级经济学系列讲座2018秋季学期第五讲(总第411讲)
主办单位: WISE&SOE
类型: 系列讲座