主讲人 |
Cheng-Zhong Qin |
简介 |
<p>Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute in the workplace.<br />
A novel area of research in economics is whether socializing in the workplace can<br />
foster altruistic behavior that helps to resolve the free-rider problem. This paper<br />
analyzes a model in which players become altruistic in workplace settings framed<br />
as general prisoner's dilemma. Such endogenous altruism has signi cant empirical<br />
relevance. A complete characterization of the equilibrium degrees, the extents to<br />
which players wish to be altruistic towards their counterparts, of altruism promoting<br />
cooperation is established. The result implies that promoting cooperation through<br />
rational altruism is robust with respect to asymmetries. Furthermore, there exists a<br />
positive correlation between the range of equilibrium degrees of altruism promoting<br />
cooperation and two known indices of cooperation in prisoner's dilemma. As a by<br />
product, this paper provides a rationale for these indices of cooperation.<br />
</p> |