Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice

Qianfeng Tang

<p>We propose a new notion of weak stability for two-sided matching problems. A matching is said to be weakly stable if matching any of its blocking pairs inevitably&nbsp;creates new blocking pairs. We then apply this concept to school choice and study its&nbsp;compatibility with the Pareto efficiency of students&rsquo; welfare. Our main result shows&nbsp;that if a matching is not Pareto dominated by any matching more stable than it, then it is weakly stable if and only if it is the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance outcome when its own set of blocking pairs is used as consenting constraint.&nbsp;</p>

2017-04-10(Monday)16:40-18:00

N302, Econ Building

English

WISE&SOE

系列讲座

Mengling Li

<div>Qianfeng Tang is an associate professor at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, he received his Ph.D. degree from&nbsp;The University of Texas at Austin, 2011. Prof. Tang's &nbsp;research interests include microeconomic theory, game theory, market design.</div> <div><a href="/Upload/File/2017/4/20170405095102526.pdf"><br type="_moz" /> </a></div> <div><a href="/Upload/File/2017/4/20170405095102526.pdf">Prof. Tang's CV</a></div>

高级经济学系列讲座2017春季学期第四讲（总第381讲）