主讲人 |
Atsushi Kajii |
简介 |
<p>“Ambiguity”or “vagueness” can be a strategic variable for a party with informational advantage. There is a large class of strategic environments where ambiguity is an important and useful strategic variable, but modeling strategic ambiguity unambiguously is a challenge. I will argue that “ambiguity” can be understood as concealed Bayesian information, and strategic ambiguity can formally be addressed with a minimal departure from the standard theory of Bayesian games.</p> |
主讲人简介 |
<p>Professor of Economics, Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, chief editor of Journal of Mathematical Economics.</p>
<div><a href="http://www.1234.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/pdf/Kajii_rireki_en.pdf"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 255);"><u><strong>Atsushi Kajii's personal website</strong></u></span></a></div> |
期数 |
“WISE-SOE”高级经济学系列讲座2016秋季学期第十二讲(总第377讲) |