|
主讲人 |
Wooyoung Lim |
简介 |
<div>Abstract</div>
<div>Current papers (Avery 1998, Daniel and Hirshleifer 1998) conclude that seller’s</div>
<div>revenue decreases when jump bidding occurs, which is in sharp contrast to the fact</div>
<div>that jump bidding is allowed rather than forbidden by sellers in real-life auctions (e.g., Sotheby’s auctions, the FCC spectrum auctions). We conduct laboratory experiments of private-value auctions, and confirm that seller’s revenue increases significantly when jump bidding is allowed. We rationalize our experimental findings by providing a novel theory of jump bidding, which shows that jump bidding equilibria dominate the no-jump equilibrium regarding seller’s revenue, when bidders are risk averse.</div>
<div> </div> |
|
主讲人简介 |
<div>Department of Economics</div>
<div>The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology</div>
<div> </div>
<div><a href="/EventsMgr/Upload/File/2015/4/20150428115833326.pdf"> Prof. Wooyoung Lim‘CV</a></div> |
期数 |
“WISE-SOE”高级经济学系列讲座2015春季学期第七讲（总第346讲）--微观领域 |
