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主讲人 |
曹志刚 |
简介 |
<p>We investigate informal risk sharing using a dynamic network game model. In each round, a randomly selected agent experiences a negative shock, and the agent's friends decide whether to provide assistance. Assuming that agents have concave utility functions, we prove a version of the Folk Theorem. Our analysis shows that a pair of agents are able to help each other in all relevant rounds of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if this connection is a part of a subgraph, in which each agent has a number of friends that is neither too low nor too high. We refer to this type of a subgraph as an inner-core. Connected inner-cores can be understood as communities. Although optimization problems related to inner-cores are generally NP-hard, we are able to perform several natural comparative statics.</p> |
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主讲人简介 |
<p>曹志刚，北京交通大学经济管理学院教授。2010年毕业于中科院数学与系统科学研究院并留院任助理研究员。2017年9月加盟北京交通大学经济管理学院。长期从事合作博弈、交通博弈、网络博弈和算法博弈等方面的研究，在包括Operations Research、Mathematics of Operations Research、Games and Economic Behavior、Journal of Mathematical Economics、Social Choice and Welfare、International Journal of Game Theory和《中国科学：数学》在内的期刊上发表多篇论文。相关成果曾获中国信息经济学理论贡献奖、系统科学与系统工程青年科技奖、中国决策科学青年科技奖和关肇直青年研究奖等荣誉。先后主持国家自然科学基金委的青年、面上和优青项目。兼任中国“双法”研究会智能决策与博弈分会副理事长、中国运筹学会博弈论分会副理事长、中国系统工程学会副秘书长、中国信息经济学会常务理事、管理科学与工程学会理事和中国运筹学会理事等职务。</p> |
期数 |
高级经济学系列讲座2023年秋季学期第三讲（总465讲） |
