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主讲人 |
Weicheng Min |
简介 |
<p>This paper studies the role of a recommender's career concerns in his long-run relationship with a consumer when the recommender has a private type in his expertise. An informed type's expertise is valuable for ongoing purchasing decisions of the consumer, whereas an uninformed type lacks the expertise. The uninformed type cannot mimic the informed type, suggesting that the informed type can build a reputation for competence and that an equilibrium should exhibit information transmission. Nonetheless, I find that the relationship completely breaks down if the recommender is sufficiently patient and thus has stronger career concerns. Moreover, this occurs even when the uncertainty of expertise is arbitrarily small.</p> |
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主讲人简介 |
<p class="MsoNormal">Weicheng Min received his Ph.D. in Economics from Yale University in 2022 and joined Antai School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiaotong University as an Assistant Professor. Prior to this, he received a Bachelor's degree from Fudan University and a Master's degree from London School of Economics and Political Science. He is primarily interested in microeconomic theory and behavioral economics, with special emphasis on information economics and bounded rationality.</p> |
期数 |
高级经济学系列讲座2023年春季学期第三讲（总459讲） |
