Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: Theory and Application

Xiang Han

<p>Blood donations by volunteer non-remunerated donors can only meet less than 50% of demand in 56 countries where blood banks had to adopt replacement donor programs to provide blood to patients in return for donations made by their donors. These programs are inefficient, as they limit the direct exchange of donors among patients. We introduce a novel framework and propose a general mechanism class accommodating efficiency objectives that embed current practices and other plausible fairness criteria. These mechanisms are incentive-compatible for patients to truthfully reveal their utility functions and replacement donors. Our framework also applies to other multi-unit exchange problems.</p>

2024-11-07 (Thursday) 16:40-18:00

Room N302, Economics Building

English

厦门大学经济学院、王亚南经济研究院、邹至庄经济研究院

系列讲座

Mengling Li

<p>Xiang Han is an Associate Professor at the School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. His areas of specialization are matching theory and market design. His work has appeared in journals such as Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Economic Theory and Theoretical Economics.&nbsp;</p>

高级经济学系列讲座2024年秋季学期第六讲（总484讲）