篇名： Barriers to Trade and Imperfect Competition: The Choice of Commodity Tax Base
刊名： International Tax and Public Finance
ISSN： 0927-5940
卷期： 12 卷 3 期 出版日期： 200506
页码： 从 281 页到 300 页共 20 页
作者： HaufLer Andreas Department of Economics,University of Munich. Munich Germany.
Schjelderup Guttorm Department of Economics,Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration and CESifo. Bergen Norway.
St盲hler Frank Department of Economics,University of Otago. Dunedin New Zealand.
文摘： Recent work has started to analyze the choice of international commodity tax base under conditions of imperfect competition. This paper focuses on the effects of changing levels of trade barriers in a model where firms engage in duopoly competition and governments set commodity taxes non-cooperatively. It is shown that the consumption base (destination principle) dominates the production base (origin principle) when trade costs are high, but the ranking of the two tax bases is reversed for low levels of trade costs. We conclude that the case for origin-based commodity taxes becomes stronger when barriers to trade fall.
篇名： Cost Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance
刊名： International Tax and Public Finance
ISSN： 0927-5940
卷期： 12 卷 3 期 出版日期： 200506
页码： 从 239 页到 263 页共 25 页
作者： Caball茅 Jordi Unitat de Fonaments de l鈥橝n脿lisi Econ貌mica and CODE, Departament d鈥橢conomia i d鈥橦ist貌ria Econ貌mica,Universitat Aut貌noma de Barcelona. Edifici B 08193 Bellaterra Barcelona Spain.
Panad茅s Judith Unitat de Fonaments de l鈥橝n脿lisi Econ貌mica,Universitat Aut貌noma de Barcelona. Spain.
文摘： The existence of a private cost borne by audited taxpayers affects the tax enforcement policy. This is so because tax auditors will face now two sources of uncertainty, namely, the typical one associated with taxpayers鈥?income and that associated with the taxpayers鈥?idiosyncratic attitude towards tax compliance. Moreover, the inspection policy can be exposed to some randomness from the taxpayers鈥?viewpoint due to the uncertainty about the audit cost borne by the tax authority. In this paper we provide an unified framework to analyze the effects of all these sources of uncertainty in a model of tax compliance with strategic interaction between auditors and taxpayers. We show that more variance in the distribution of the taxpayers鈥?private cost of evading raises both tax compliance and the ex-ante welfare of taxpayers. The effects of the uncertainty about the audit cost faced by the tax authority are generally ambiguous. We also discuss the implications of our model for the regressive (or progressive) bias of the effective tax system.
篇名： Financing Public Goods with Income Taxation: Provision Rules vs. Provision Level
刊名： International Tax and Public Finance
ISSN： 0927-5940
卷期： 12 卷 3 期 出版日期： 200506
页码： 从 319 页到 334 页共 16 页
作者： Gaube Thomas Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10 D-53113 Bonn Germany.
文摘： Due to the use of distortionary taxation, many believe that real-world economies should attain a lower level of public expenditures than in a situation where lump-sum taxes are available. The present paper examines this hypothesis by means of the two-type self-selection model of income taxation. Based on the findings of Boadway and Keen (1993), I provide sufficient conditions for both a lower and a higher level of public expenditures in second best than in first best. In particular, it is shown that the separability assumption of Christiansen (1981) leads to under-provision of the public good in the income tax optimum.
篇名： Interregional Income Redistribution and Convergence in a Model with Perfect Capital Mobility and Unionized Labor Markets
刊名： International Tax and Public Finance
ISSN： 0927-5940
卷期： 12 卷 3 期 出版日期： 200506
页码： 从 301 页到 318 页共 18 页
作者： Bonatti Luigi Facolt脿 di Economia,University of Bergamo. via dei Caniana 2 20127 Bergamo Italy.
文摘： The model presents a general equilibrium dynamic model of an economy consisting of many regions. Capital is perfectly mobile and labor is immobile across regions. Wages are determined by local unions. There is training on the job and strategic complementarity between investment in physical capital by firms and investment in becoming 鈥渢rainable鈥欌€?by workers. Structurally similar regional economies preserve forever their differences in per capita output and employment rate, if the workers鈥?non-labor income is equalized across regions by interregional income redistribution operated via central budget. Regional decentralization of income redistribution allows convergence in per capita output and employment rate.
篇名： Optimal Self-Reporting Schemes with Multiple Stages and Option Values
刊名： International Tax and Public Finance
ISSN： 0927-5940
卷期： 12 卷 3 期 出版日期： 200506
页码： 从 265 页到 279 页共 15 页
作者： Feess Eberhard Department of Economics,University of Aachen. Templergraben 64 52062 Aachen Germany.
Walzl Markus Department of Economics and METEOR,Universiteit Maastricht. Post Box 616 NL-6200 Maastricht MD The Netherlands.
文摘： We consider a model of optimal law enforcement where sanctions can be reduced for self-reporting individuals. We distinguish between a first self-reporting stage before the case is investigated and a second one where the criminal is detected, but not yet convicted. Since we assume that violators have private information in both stages, fine reductions for self-reporting individuals lead ceteris paribus to a higher violation frequency. Nevertheless, we show that fine reductions should be granted in both stages. We characterize the connection between the two fine reductions in the optimal policy and relate our results to self-reporting schemes observed in reality.
